In March this year, the last elected president of Yemen, Abd Rabbo
Mansour Hadi, formally asked the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to
intervene militarily against his country’s Al Houthi rebels, after he
escaped from a palace where Al Houthis had imprisoned him along with
several of his senior aides. At the time, the Yemeni Foreign Minister
Riad Yassin warned that the ongoing conflict affected the entire nation,
clarifying that Al Houthis wrecked the proposed GCC peace talks in
Riyadh that, presumably, encouraged all Yemenis to rekindle their plans
to sabotage the lingering national dialogue.
In time, and after
Yemeni authorities concluded that Al Houthis rejected any and all peace
initiatives (those proposed by the GCC and those brokered by the UN
Security Council), President Hadi formally requested the GCC’s Peninsula
Shield Force to intervene and end the Al Houthi expansion across the
country. Saudi Arabia’s then Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal
expressed GCC States’ sentiment best when he stated: “The Al Houthi coup
threatens the security and stability of Yemen, the region and the
world,” and warned that “if the Al Houthi coup does not end peacefully,
we will take the necessary measures for this crisis to protect the
region.”
Importantly, and while not a full-fledged GCC alliance
member, Yemeni security was inseparable from the preoccupations that
mobilised GCC states, which was the chief reason why Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain intervened to
protect the Arabian Peninsula. Only Oman refrained though the GCC
secretary general labelled the Al Houthi takeover of parts of Yemen as a
“terrorist” act. Presumably, Muscat signed on to this appellation even
if the Sultanate preferred to leave the door ajar for an eventual
diplomatic settlement.
Notwithstanding the Omani desire to reduce
tensions, few believed that Al Houthi control of the capital city,
Sana’a, in September 2014 — along with several northern provinces —
would be allowed to stand, although President Hadi did not formally
request military assistance until after his temporary base in the port
city of Aden came under attack. The late Saudi King Abdullah and his
successor, King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, displayed incredible patience,
waiting for the UN Security Council to act after it sanctioned the two
top Al Houthi leaders as well as the maverick former Yemeni strongman
Ali Abdullah Saleh. In the event, the Iranian-backed Al Houthis and
military supporters of Saleh made steady advances, captured much of the
third largest city of Taiz, as well as its airport, and eventually
reached Aden.
What are the objectives of the GCC states in general, and those of the UAE in particular, in the war for Yemen?
To
be sure, the first goal of the war was to liberate the country from Al
Houthis and bring Hadi back to power, which was partially achieved. Far
more important, however, the UAE and its allies focused on the security
and stability of the Arabian Peninsula, which the pro-Iranian Al Houthis
threatened. That much was a given and, in the words of Dr Anwar
Gargash, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, “the difficult
decision has now become necessary in confronting Al Houthi violence and
rebellion and strategic threat to the Gulf through missiles, which pose
an unacceptable growing threat.”
After what seemed like
interminable negotiations, the UAE agreed to join Saudi Arabia and the
other eight coalition members to launch airstrikes against Al Houthi
rebels, because it concluded that the Emirates’s own security was at
risk. At first, the UAE deployed a few dozen warplanes, though it also
put boots on the ground when the battle required it. It took serious
casualties under both Operation Decisive Storm (March 26-April 21, 2015)
and Operation Restoring Hope (April 22, 2015-present), as a total of 70
Emirati soldiers were martyred. This fact alone sealed the UAE’s
resolve that would deny Iran, which carried the banner of Al Houthis,
any kind of victory.
Senior UAE leaders, including His Highness
Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister
of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, as well as His Highness Shaikh Mohammad
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, were adamant in their commitments to
help the Yemenis overcome Al Houthi onslaught.
Given Al Houthis’
militant nature, and their reluctance to accept the vast majority of
Yemenis who disagreed with their allegiance to Iran, it was difficult to
foresee a political solution to the ongoing confrontations.
Interestingly,
and whatever differences existed among the twin military pillars of the
GCC, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it is fair to state that the war for
Yemen has brought the two countries closer together than at any other
previous time. In fact, GCC countries thwarted Iranian attempts to
divide the GCC even if Oman retained its political distance from core
military decisions. What the UAE wished to achieve was to guarantee the
security of Yemen, persuaded that doing so protected the security of the
entire Gulf region. Naturally, the preferred option was to reach a
peaceful solution to get Yemen out from the dark tunnel that Al Houthis
had dug, though the will to intervene militarily became inevitable after
all possible political solutions were exhausted.
Of course, the
UAE perceived Iran’s hegemony and expansionist strategy in the region
with alarm, though limited media coverage of the war skirted Tehran’s
brazen activities. Coalition members accused Iran of militarily and
financially supporting Al Houthis, backed by John Kerry, the US
Secretary of State, who recognised that there were “obviously supplies
that have been coming from Iran” even while he and his team were
negotiating in earnest with Tehran to reach an agreement over the
latter’s nuclear programme. In fact, Iran dispatched dozens of flights
before hostilities broke, providing Al Houthis with weapons. Not
surprisingly, Iran denied these claims, though government troops in Aden
said that they captured two officers who belonged to the Iranian Quds
Force in early April, presumed military advisers to Al Houthi militias
in the city. The claim was not repeated and the officers were kept in
abeyance, which buttressed the argument that Al Houthis were not just an
Iranian proxy force, even if reliable assertions surfaced that Iran
shipped weapons to the Al Houthis between 2009 and 2013. Whether fresh
supplies reached Yemen after 2013 was a hotly debated issue although the
over-militarised Yemeni society was never shy of arms.
Consequently,
and even if Iran did not exert, or only partially wielded, command and
control over Al Houthis in Yemen, there was little doubt that Tehran
cared deeply about the hapless country and its co-religionists there.
In
fact, on May 6, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, opined
that “the Americans shamelessly support the killing of the Yemeni
population, but they accuse Iran of interfering in that country and of
sending weapons when Iran only seeks to provide medical and food aid,”
something which few believed since media reports affirmed that an
Iranian fishing boat loaded with weapons, including rockets and
anti-tank shells, was intercepted and seized 150 miles southeast of the
Omani Port of Salalah on September 26. Few doubted that Iran was
effective in achieving regional prominence. Its presence in the region’s
failed states, including Lebanon where Hezbollah exerted undue power
and, against the will of the majority, unequivocally supported the
Bashar Al Assad regime, was well known.
Similarly, Tehran tamed
the US-backed government in Baghdad, and wished to do likewise with Al
Houthis of Yemen. Bahraini and Kuwaiti authorities repeatedly arrested
scores of operatives smuggling Iranian arms into their countries.
Ironically, by sending weapons, mercenaries and some of its
Revolutionary Guards to fight in Syria and elsewhere, Iran justified its
various actions under the brilliant manoeuvre of combating both
terrorism and Western imperialism.
For its part, the UAE rejected
Iranian pretence of innocence and backed the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen
for yet another reason, namely the threat to trade were Iran to
dominate the strategic straits of Hormuz and Bab Al Mandeb.
Inasmuch
as economic and military sanctions imposed on Iran for over two decades
seriously damaged the latter’s welfare, most observers concluded that
Tehran finally accepted the will of the international community over its
ongoing nuclear programme, to alleviate what was a serious economic
strangulation. To be sure, Iranian negotiators proved their mettle and,
it may be safe to state that while Tehran managed to mount
counter-measures, it reluctantly accepted strict conditions imposed by
the P5+1 group. Yet, GCC states in general and the UAE in particular,
experienced the Iranian deceptions for decades as Tehran used the trade
weapon to discourage several countries from cooperating with sanctions
or aligning themselves too closely with the anti-Iran camp.
Tehran
thus used trade to discourage several GCC states from forming a united
anti-Iranian front headed by Saudi Arabia even if the post-2011 Arab
uprisings meant that political considerations would determine the
direction that conservative Arab monarchies pursued. In late 2011 and
early 2012, Iran called for the joint development of its shared gas
fields with Kuwait and Qatar, though it deliberately left out the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, believing that it did not need to bother with
its ideological and strategic foe.
In late August this year, it
reached an agreement with Oman to build a new 400-km gas pipeline that
would carry Iranian natural gas to Sohar on the Sea of Oman in the
Indian Ocean. According to press reports, Tehran aimed to export 28
million cubic metres of gas per day to Oman for 15 years that, at
current prices could eventually fetch $60 billion. This was a clear
example of the method used by Iran to create an economic wedge within
the GCC that, left unchallenged, would have a serious impact on the
regional alliance.
It continued to insist that whatever agreements
were reached over regional security arrangements must, by definition,
receive its approval since it was the leading power in the area, though
it was oblivious to its calls for sectarian uprisings in Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia that, naturally, irritated both monarchies and further
altered perceptions throughout the GCC realm.
For all its prowess,
nevertheless, Iran failed to divide the GCC alliance and though it
blocked imports from the UAE “as a punitive measure” in response to the
UAE’s support for US sanctions before the P5+1 accord was reached in
mid-2015, its economic co-option strategy tumbled after the UAE joined
the Saudi military coalition to fight Al Houthis in Yemen. There were no
doubts that the UAE was 100 per cent aligned with Saudi policy towards
Iran, something that the so-called economic co-option strategy was
supposed to prevent, but could not because the UAE agreed with Riyadh.
If
the UAE was lukewarm towards international sanctions against Iran
before 2011 because Emiratis benefited from their economic ties with
that country, recent Iranian bravura to close the strategic straits of
Hormuz and Bab Al Mandeb, the war in Yemen, and perceived Iranian
meddling in GCC internal affairs — especially in Bahrain and Kuwait —
essentially removed any lingering doubts.
The war for Yemen
provided an opportunity for the GCC as a whole, and the UAE in
particular, to defend intrinsic interests that, while cognizant of an
important Iran as a neighbour, were nevertheless no longer willing to
roll over and play dead.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author
of the forthcoming From Alliance To Union: Challenges Facing Gulf
Cooperation Council States In The Twenty-First Century.
A chronology of key events in Yemen
- 1500s: Ottomans absorb part of Yemen into their empire but are expelled in the 1600s.
- 1839: Aden comes under British rule, and when the Suez Canal opens in 1869 serves as a major refuelling port.
- 1849: Ottomans return to north, but later face revolt.
- 1918: Ottoman empire dissolves, North Yemen gains independence and is ruled by Imam Yahya.
- 1948: Yahya assassinated, but his son Ahmad beats off opponents of feudal rule and succeeds his father.
- 1962: Imam Ahmad dies, succeeded by his son but army officers seize power, set up the Yemen Arab Republic.
- 1967: Formation of People’s Republic of Yemen, comprising Aden and former Protectorate of South Arabia.
- 1969:
Marxists take power in south, rename state People’s Democratic Republic
of Yemen and reorient economy, society and foreign policy towards
Soviet bloc.
- 1971: Thousands flee to north following crackdown on dissidents. Armed groups formed in bid to overthrow government.
- 1972: Border clashes between two Yemens, ceasefire brokered by Arab League.
- 1978: Ali Abdallah Saleh becomes president of North Yemen.
- 1979: Fresh fighting between two Yemens. Renewed efforts to unite the two states.
- 1986:
Thousands die in south in political rivalry. President Ali Nasser
Muhammad flees the country and is later sentenced to death for treason.
New government formed.
- 1990 May: Two Yemens united as Republic
of Yemen with Saleh as president, as Soviet bloc implodes. Tension
between former states endures.
- 1993 April: Coalition government formed, made up of ruling parties of former north and south.
- 1993 August: Vice-President Ali Salim Al Baid withdraws to Aden, alleging that south is being marginalised.
- 1994
May: Saleh declares state of emergency and dismisses Al Baid and other
southern government members following political deadlock.
- 1994
May-July: Al Baid declares independence of Democratic Republic of Yemen.
Northern forces capture Aden while southern leaders flee abroad.
- 1995: Yemen, Eritrea clash over disputed islands in Red Sea.
- 2000 October: US naval vessel USS Cole damaged in Al Qaida suicide attack in Aden. Seventeen US personnel killed.
- 2001
February: Violence in run-up to disputed municipal polls and
referendum, which back extension to presidential term and powers.
- 2002
October: Al Qaida attacks and badly damages oil supertanker MV Limburg
in Gulf of Aden, killing one and injuring 12 crew members and costing
Yemen dear in lost port revenues.
- 2003 April: The 10 chief suspects in the bombing of the USS Cole escape from custody in Aden. Two are re-captured in 2004.
- 2004 June-August: Hundreds die as troops battle Shiite insurgency led by Hussain Al Houthi in the north.
- 2004 September: Government says its forces have killed dissident cleric Hussain Al Houthi, the leader of a revolt in the north.
- 2005
March-April: More than 200 people are killed in a resurgence of
fighting between government forces and supporters of the slain rebel
cleric Hussain Al Houthi.
- 2005 May: President Saleh says the
leader of the rebellion in the north has agreed to renounce the campaign
in return for a pardon.
- 2006 March: More than 600 followers
of Hussain Al Houthi who were captured following a rebellion he led in
2004 are released under an amnesty.
- 2006 September: President Saleh wins another term in elections.
- 2007 January-March: Scores are killed or wounded in clashes between security forces and Al Houthi rebels in the north.
- 2007 June: Rebel leader Abdul Malik Al Houthi accepts a ceasefire.
- 2007 July: Suicide bomber attacks a tourist convoy killing eight Spaniards and two Yemenis in the province of Marib.
- 2007 August: Citizens banned from carrying firearms in Sana’a. Demonstrations without a permit are outlawed.
- 2008 January: Renewed clashes between security forces and rebels loyal to Abdul Malik Al Houthi.
- 2008 September: Attack on US embassy in Yemeni capital Sana’a kills 18 people, including six assailants. Six suspects arrested.
- 2008 October: President Saleh announces arrest of suspected militants allegedly linked to Israeli intelligence.
- 2008
November: Police fire warning shots at Common Forum opposition rally in
Sana’a. Demonstrators demand electoral reform and fresh polls.
- 2009 August: The Yemeni army launches a fresh offensive against rebels in the northern Saada province.
- 2009 November: Saudi Arabia says it has regained control of territory seized by Yemeni rebels in a cross-border incursion.
- 2009 December: Yemen-based branch of Al Qaida claims it was behind failed attack on US airliner.
- 2010 February: Government signs ceasefire with Al Houthi northern rebels, which breaks down in December.
- 2010 September: Thousands flee government offensive against separatists in southern Shabwa province.
- 2011
January: Tunisian street protests encourage similar demonstrations in
other countries, including Yemen. President Saleh pledges not to extend
his presidency in 2013 or to hand over to his son.
- 2011 June:
After months of mounting protests, President Saleh is injured in rocket
attack and flown to Saudi Arabia, returning home in September.
- 2011 November: President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
- 2012 February: Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi inaugurated as president.
- 2012 September: Defence Minister Mohammad Nasir Ahmad survives car bomb attack in Sana’a that kills 11 people.
- 2012 November: A Saudi diplomat and his bodyguard are shot dead in Sana’a.
- 2014
January: National Dialogue Conference winds up after 10 months of
deliberation, agreeing a document on which the new constitution will be
based.
- 2014 February: Presidential panel gives approval for
Yemen to become a federation of six regions as part of its political
transition.
- 2014 July: Tribesmen blow up the country’s largest
oil pipeline, disrupting supplies from the interior to a Red Sea export
terminal.
- 2014 August: President Hadi sacks his cabinet and
overturns a controversial fuel price rise following two weeks of
anti-government protests.
- 2014 September: Al Houthi rebels take control of the most of capital Sana’a.
- 2015 January: Al Houthis reject draft constitution proposed by government.
- 2015 February: Al Houthis appoint presidential council to replace President Hadi, who flees to Aden southern stronghold.
- 2015
March: Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) carries out its
first major attacks in Yemen — two suicide bombings in which 137 people
are killed.
- Al Houthi rebels start to advance towards southern Yemen. President Hadi leaves Aden.
- Saudi-led coalition of Gulf Arab states launches air strikes against Al Houthi targets and imposes naval blockade.
- 2015
September: President Hadi returns to Aden after Saudi-backed government
forces recapture the port city from Al Houthi forces and launch advance
on Aden.
Compiled from agencies
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/a-campaign-to-halt-iran-s-expansionist-strategy-1.1608798
